INTRODUCTION This volume of Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations (REIO)
In searching for a conference theme, the organising committee was faced -as indeed most are -with the challenge of providing a topic that (a) was broad enough to be inclusive of the eclectic range of research and practice interests of the members and associates of AAPAE while (b) not being completely nebulous. Ultimately 'Applied Ethics in the Fractured State' was agreed upon. Yet the decision was not merely expedient.
For instance, many traditions of political and ethical writing have defended the concept of the state as the legitimate site of ultimate authority -an authority which is justified not merely instrumentally but also normatively. In the (broadly) liberal tradition at least, we might be led to think of Hobbes' Leviathan (1914 [1651 ) on particular on this point, and in a clichéd way.
However, there are more contemporary and (arguably) very influential examples (see, for instance, Moore 1995) . Moreover, it is an institutional fact that the laws enacted in (say) the parliaments of Australia and its constituent sovereign states only come into force when they are consented to by the Crown. And the situation is more or less similar in other types of political systems -in republics, for example -save the absence of a monarch. So the idea of there being an ultimate, legitimate authority is very much -and literally -an enacted one in our day-to-day lives.
However, a vast quantum of writing (particularly in the broadly liberal tradition) has sought to place limits upon this authority, justified on instrumental grounds, but also for profound moral reasons (and recognizing that the split between 'instrumental' on the one hand and 'moral/ethical' on the other hand is in any event a misnomer). And while we might be led, at least initially, to think of the concept of the separation of powers in a very modern sense -for instance, a la The Federalist Papers (see, for instance, Kammen 1986) and the philosophical underpinnings of this in inter alia Locke's (1988 Locke's ( [1698 justification of private property, we can remind ourselves that writers as diverse as Machiavelli (1979 Machiavelli ( [1517 ) and Hegel (1952 Hegel ( [1820 ) advanced profound justifications of the division of authority in political systems, while at precisely the same time advocating for the unity of those systems.
Moreover, the few (the very few) of us that exercise an interest in sub-national government would point out that the idea of subsidiarity has, inter alia profound deontological foundations (see, for instance, Drew and Grant 2017 Provis notes (1) that the three types of problems are intertwined and (2) that both deontological and teleological attempts at addressing them have proven less than satisfactory.
In inquiring into the possibilities for a virtue ethics account of role prescriptions and
Confucian virtue ethics in particular he contests what might be described as the bifurcation of Confucian virtue ethics (as, in essence, role derived) and Western virtue ethics (as, in essence, trait-based or individuated), while nevertheless asserting that choice is a more salient feature of business than Confucianism and that slavish conformity is at odds with classical Confucianism also. Rather, Confucianism ought to be understood as commencing from an understanding of everyday life (including the familial) which is virtue-based (for instance rén, or 'humanness'; zhī, or 'wisdom' and chéng, or 'integrity/sincerity') and where role performance is situated rather than ideal, requiring considered judgement (not relativism) rather than conformity.
Revisiting the ethical problems associated with roles equipped with this understanding of Confucian virtue ethics, Provis argues that role relativism is militated against by seeing roles in their broader contexts and that problems of role ambiguity and role conflict can be seen with the advantage that virtue ethics offers, namely with an emphasis on integrity and authenticity when set against both deontological and teleological approaches. Moreover, problems of role identification (either 'under-identification' and 'over-identification') are seen not only through a deontological or consequentialist lens, but with (again) with proper attention to integrity.
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In her contribution, Chand R. Sirimanne provides an account of the significance of intention (cetanā) in Buddhist ethics (specifically a Theravāda Buddhist stance) and asserts its increased relevance in our digital age, where (arguably) the ethical self is increasing distanced from our actions. Noting the 'Four Noble Truths' and the 'Eightfold Path' to Enlightenment, the author emphasizes the inseparability of psychology an ethics in Buddhism and that intent, or volition, is key to the ethos of same, and can be disaggregated into intention of renunciation; intention of good will and intention of harmlessness.
Sirimanne performs the valuable service of explaining some common misunderstandings about core elements of Buddhism. Thus, karma does not signify the (unintended) consequences of actions (or 'just deserts'); rather it denotes wholesome and unwholesome
volitions. Meditation (bhāvanā) ought to be understood not as introspection but as a 'cultivation of the mind', and anattā not as a lack of agency but as a questioning of the concept of an extant and fully-formed soul -rather, this has to be developed. Sirimanne also outlines the reasons for the popularity of Buddhism in the West, namely the lack of a deity; the onus on the individual to achieve salvation; the absence of moral absolutes; its questioning approach to ethical issues and its advocacy of compassion. While there are similarities with elements of utilitarianism and virtue ethics (in particular its Eudaimonist branch), the author notes that the central doctrine of anatta (non-self) rules out any direct parallel, as (arguably) does Buddha's acceptance of women in monastic orders.
This appreciation of intent (cetanā) allows for different (but by no means wholly unfamiliar) ethical perspectives on issues such as abortion, suicide, discrimination and the parameters of sexual behaviour. Noting that the application of these ideas to governance and morality is complex ('only a fool becomes a king' -see Zimmerman (2015)) Sirimanne nevertheless argues that a Buddhist ethos, grounded in an understanding of intent (cetanā) militates against the increasing anonymity of the digital age.
The second broad area covered in this edition of REIO is medical ethics. In his contribution, Xavier Symons investigates conscientious objection in health care, asking how we might distinguish between legitimate conscience claims and those based upon prejudice. The
Rawlsian 'reasonableness' approach is contrasted with both the 'genuineness test' for 7 conscientious objection (which rests on the profundity of belief) and the 'incompatibility account', where any objection is assessed against the obligations of health care professionals.
Symons provides an account of Rawls' concepts of 'reasonableness' and 'reasonable disagreement', grounded as they are on a procedural account of justice and being richer than an account based upon mere rationality, to necessarily involve normative principlesparticularly that any inequality must not include inequality of opportunity and that any systematic inequalities must be of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged in the long-run.
Moreover, any disagreement must be compatible with public reason rather than absolutist. For Symons (following Rhodes 2012) the transposition of this framework of 'reasonableness' and 'reasonable disagreement' from the political to the medical is justified on the grounds that basic medical care is an essential service; that medical care involves consensual interventions that would otherwise be classified as violations of bodily integrity; that health care is an issue of equality of opportunity and that medical practice is circumscribed by law. As such, the normative framework for decisions about conscientious objection ought to be the same as those that frame (Rawlsian) political discourse.
Importantly for Symons, all of this is underlain by the (Rawlsian) defense of 'liberty of In any discussion of contemporary issues in applied ethics, the subjects of euthanasia and assisted suicide loom large. In their contribution to this 'Special Edition', Judith Kennedy MD and Michael Kennedy MD examine the consequences of the increased support for euthanasia and assisted suicide in Australia. The authors are careful to specify the parameters of their discussion, stating that rather than assessing the arguments for and against the two practices they are interested in examining the 'moral vulnerabilities of medical practice when both euthanasia and assisted suicide are added to the therapeutic armamentarium'.
Commencing with a definition of medicine, the authors examine how long-standing law across Australia's jurisdictions has addressed the question of inter alia the terminally ill, arguing that this has been consistent with the goals of medicine. Yet this is rapidly changing.
Noting the recent legislative developments in the Australian states of Victoria and New South Wales (NSW), Kennedy and Kennedy provide timely evidence as to how a range of professional associations -the Australian Medical Association (AMA), the Advent Mutual
Group (the largest professional indemnity organization in Australia), the College of Nursing, the Australian Psychological Association (APA) and the Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) have all positioned themselves in relation to the issue. The authors make several observations about these changes, including that the incorporation of killing into Australian medical practice has already begun -signified not only by the position statements provided by the aforementioned organisations, also by an identifiable change in nomenclature; also that legalized killing in health care will necessarily involve a range of professions and require actively managing the attitude and behaviour of these professionals. They also explore how these changes are leading to moves to protect both patients and professionals, particularly doctors.
The authors' position is overwhelmingly one of profound concern. They detail several challenges to medical practice arising from these developments and examine these from a squarely moral perspective, emphasising that while doctors do not act alone, the responsibility will rest principally with them. They conclude by noting that authorization to kill could very well result in a 'slippery slope' (our phrase) situation and note developments in other jurisdictions that are indicative of this.
In their contribution to this 'Special Edition' of REIO Joseph Drew and Bligh Grant examine the same issues of concern in the previous chapter, but through the lens of the 'Principle of Double Effect' (PDE) and utilizing an in-depth case study. Initially the authors' underscore the basis of PDE in Natural Philosophy, which holds that there are binding and universal truths that are discernable by reason and hold for all people, one of which -the most important for their discussion -is human life, and around which the propositions of 'dignity'
'the common good' and 'solidarity' coalesce. The authors also note that while Natural Law is often associated with Christianity and Catholic Social Teaching (CST) in particular in fact it is also associated with Aristotle and the three major monotheistic faiths (Judaism, Islam and Christianity) and that the precepts of Natural Law are enshrined and enacted in many judicial systems.
Following from a definition of PDE, the authors emphasize that 'foreseeability', 'proportionality' and -as we saw in Chand Sirimanne's contribution in her discussion of Pacey also reviews the literature on Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRA) in asking the question of whether the agency is independent and if so, from what or whom. She concludes that the Scheme is best described as a quasi-independent national regulatory agency, with government retaining some critical authority, as a means of managing socio-political risks, demonstrating the relevance of the framework of regulatory capitalism in this case study. The ensuing quest for independence is then assumed to be one designed to ensure balance, where the state can maintain influence and the professions are constructively engaged but do not have the autonomy to set their own standards and monitoring arrangements.
The discussion of the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme in the context of regulatory capitalism, independent regulatory agencies and quasi-independent bodies provides an insight into the changing institutionalization of regulatory and reform functions of the state. Her discussion of regulatory capitalism, which she defines as the merger of neoliberalism with an attentiveness to risk, situates the scheme in a larger context of increasing delegation to business, individuals and the society, while at the same time (and perhaps paradoxically) increasing regulation by the state.
In participate. Reviews are due to be completed within 60 days, although practice suggests there is some confusion as to when participating sites are endorsed and that the practices of individual organisations are diverse and inconsistent.
In their review of the relatively new literature on research governance, the authors identify concerns about overly bureaucratic and duplicative approval processes which result in delays and additional costs. The corporate governance theory of Institutional Isomorphism -the need for organisations to appear legitimate to their stakeholders -is applied to explore research governance and the NMA. The research seeks to discover if there is evidence of support for the NMA (is coercive), if there is evidence of collaboration and learning between agencies (is mimetic) or, if there is evidence of agencies participating in professional standards (is normative).
Given the robust research methodology, the study makes a number of findings, the most significant of which points to a lack of evidence that organisations were developing standard research governance responses to the NMA, thus disproving the argument of institutional theorists that organisations tend to develop similar behaviour in response to the same environmental constraints. The authors conclude that there are mixed views on how the NMA is impacting research governance; moreover that there is some confusion about its purpose.
However, they identify that the NMA has the capacity to deliver quality clinical trial outcomes, maximise resources and create performance metrics if there are consistent governance practices and that failure to harness these opportunities could see Australia lose its competitive edge in health research.
The fourth broad area is one which, arguably, sits at the core of the research and applied activities of AAPAE and of this journal, namely professional ethics. In the final paper, Helen E Christensen explores the professionalisation of those who facilitate participatory democracy within and on behalf of government institutions. In the paper, "Community engagement and professionalisation: Emerging tensions", she argues that these (arguably, emerging) professionals, who design, communicate and facilitate community engagement processes, serve multiple masters: their clients (or employers), the public good and democratic process.
Community engagement, also known as public participation, is the involvement of communities in decision-making processes around policies, plans and programs. Christensen argues that it has become a standard feature of public-state relations. Surrounding these engagement processes are those who practise it, a group which is gaining increasing scholarly attention. Christen explores whether or not the practice of community engagement can be considered a profession, and whether or not those who practise can be considered professionals. She argues that practitioners are situated as intermediaries between 13 communities on one hand and the public institutions that employ or engage them on the other hand, and that this dichotomy creates a series of tensions.
Christensen reviews the literature on professionalism and then focuses in on Noordegraaf's (2009) conceptualization of 'pure' professionalism. She then uses this framework to assess the professional status of community engagement. Through the presentation of a series of short vignettes, the author demonstrates the types of tensions practitioners may experience.
These include how inclusive practitioners are when they involve community members and the amount of control they are granted over the decision-making processes therein; whether neutrality of the practitioner should be prioritised above other virtues, and whether the needs of the practitioner, the client or the democratic process should assume priority. Christensen notes that there is currently little to no guidance for practitioners faced with these dilemmas.
In her broader observations, Christensen returns to three foundational issues. The first is whether community engagement is really a profession. Reflecting on Noordegraaf's (2009) framework, she concludes that a profile of the field is emerging and that while there is some 'semblance of a profession' it is not conclusively demonstrated. The second is what tensions community engagement practitioners face and how they manage these. The third is how ethics can inform an understanding of the professionalisation of community engagement.
Christensen concludes that there is the opportunity for reflection and examination of decision-making models, practitioners' traits and virtues to allow them to develop ethical responses to the complexities they face in their practice. She also concludes that community engagement practitioners are uniquely placed between communities and institutions and that there is an opportunity for the field to support practitioners in making good decisions in the face of the inevitable dilemmas that arise from this unique position. Moreover, the failure to harness this opportunity may adversely impact practitioners, public institutions and democracy itself.
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